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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 001049

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STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
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TAGS: [MARR](#) [SNAR](#) [PGOV](#) [AF](#)
SUBJECT: ANAP EXPANSION IN EAST AND CENTRAL

REF: A. REF A. KABUL 255
[1](#)B. REF B. KABUL 855

Classified By: POLITICAL MILITARY COUNSELOR CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.
4 (B) AND (D).

1.(C/REL ISAF) Summary: During recent visits to Kunar and Nangarhar to access the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) program, an Embassy-led team identified several problems with the program, including the Ministry of Interior,s (MOI) failure to provide adequate oversight of the vetting process, a misunderstanding of the vetting process at the provincial level, and a current lack of training facilities. Uncorrected, these deficiencies could lead to an ANAP in which the patrolmen are more loyal to a local militia commander than to the GOA. This would detrimentally affect the nation-wide security situation and hinder GoA efforts to enforce the rule of law or provide security to the citizens of Afghanistan. These challenges were identified early and Post, the international community and CSTC-A are committed to correcting the deficiencies by providing additional mentoring to the MoI and engaging the international community to provide significantly greater oversight of the ANAP vetting process. The consolidation of recruiting, vetting and training to ANAP Training Centers of Excellence, located at Jalalabad and Gardez Regional Training Centers, will allow closer supervision and better mentoring by the Dyncorps civpol professionals.

ANAP Current History

2.(C/REL ISAF) The Afghan National Auxiliary Police

(ANAP) was designed to bolster security in 121 high risk districts by recruiting, training, and deploying 11,271 patrolmen to 21 provinces. The ANAP was initially focused on providing patrolmen in six priority provinces (Ghazni, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul). Since the first ANAP graduation, which occurred in October 2006 in Zabul Province, approximately 4,500 patrolmen have completed training.

3.(C/REL ISAF) A new problem arose last fall when the MoI, without PAG approval or international community concurrence, accelerated the program and commenced simultaneous ANAP recruiting efforts in 21 provinces. This failure to apply the mutually agreed upon terms of reference resulted in the acceptance of recruits not fully qualified to serve as patrolmen. Also the number of recruits significantly exceeded the capacity of the training facilities, resulting in a backlog of recruits who were forced to wait for a space at one of the training centers. In order to regain control of the recruiting effort, in early November 2006, the PAG at the request of the international community, explicitly ordered the cessation of all recruiting and training outside six priority provinces. This PAG direction also required the MoI, prior to initiating any future actions, to brief and receive approval for the expansion of all future recruiting and training efforts. This briefing would ensure that previously approved efforts would not be negatively impacted by the

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recommended expansion and that a plan was in place to pay the recruits the appropriate salary (Note. When a patrolman is initially recruited, he is paid 800 afs, approximately \$16. However after the completion of training, the patrolman receives 3500 afs which equates to approximately \$70. End Note). In mid January 2007, based upon an expected increase of insurgent violence, the PAG endorsed the expansion of ANAP recruiting and training to eight provinces in the eastern region and Herat (Ref A).

4.(S/REL ISAF) In order to support this expansion, in December 2006, the MoI in coordination with CSTC-A and Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82), developed a plan in which the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Regional Training Centers (RTCs) would conduct limited ANAP training. Every month, each of the eight PRTs would train 50-100 recruits while two RTCs located at Jalalabad and Gardez would train approximately 240 patrolmen. This training was initially set to commence not later than March 1, 2007. However, due to logistics challenges including a lack of training facilities, only the RTCs have initiated training. PRT orchestrated training has not yet started, and is not likely to begin until late June 2007.

5.(C/REL ISAF) Shortly after the initiation of the ANAP program last fall, a US Embassy led assessment team was formed to assess the MoI,s adherence to the vetting process, progress on training, and quality and loyalty of the recruits. This team, which includes representation from the Embassy,s Pol Mil, INL/NAS, and DAO sections, as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), CSTC-A and United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), earlier conducted reviews of the ANAP programs in the Southern Command region.

Assessment visits in RC East

6.(C/REL ISAF) Following the decision of the PAG to expand ANAP to the east, the team visited Nangarhar and Kunar provinces and will visit Paktia and Ghazni in the near future. The team visited both PRT and RTC facilities and discussed the ANAP program with Provincial Governors, Provincial Police Chiefs, and senior representatives from the MoI. The team also conducted approximately 100 short interviews and several in-depth 45 minute interviews with individual recruits in order to verify the vetting process used by the MoI. In an attempt to understand more thoroughly the vetting process, a Shura was conducted with over 50 village leaders from Watah Pur district in Kunar. During this conversation, the elders identified their role as nominating good individuals to serve as ANAP and also acknowledged the importance of a national vetting procedure to ensure the quality of future patrolmen.

Issues and actions

7.(C/REL ISAF)The assessment team,s trips identified several elements that will be

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critical to the success or failure of the ANAP program, to include:

- (C/REL ISAF) Vetting and adherence to the terms of reference. In RC East, the MoI is not adhering to the agreed terms of reference. (Note. The terms of reference are the process used to ensure the quality of each recruit and include a requirement that each recruit receive a recommendation from two district tribal elders, undergo an NDS background check and complete medical screening. This process attempts to ensure that the patrolmen will be loyal to the Government of Afghanistan vice a local militia commander and that the ANAP is tribally and ethnically representative of the district from which the patrolmen are recruited. End Note). The interviews conducted clearly showed that background checks were not being properly completed, recruits were not receiving any type of medical screening and the MoI recruiting teams and Provincial Police Headquarters personnel were not properly supervising the vetting process. This has led to the recruitment of questionable individuals with suspect loyalties.
- (C/REL ISAF) Facilities. PRTs currently lack the facilities required to train and billet the recruits. Although the requirement was previously identified in December 2006, the allocation of funding coupled with the facility approval process has greatly delayed any construction efforts. The estimated cost of \$400k per training facility is significant and the size of this fiscal investment must be carefully balanced against the relatively small benefit of the capability to train only approximately 50-100 ANAP per month at each site. Although a temporary solution (tents and heaters) is being investigated, a more feasible and realistic approach, which is discussed in detail below, involves using the Jalalabad and Gardez RTCs to train only ANAP for a period of two

months (other INL training programs focused on justice and corrections will continue).

- (C/REL ISAF) Pay. The payment of ANAP salaries is still problematic and there are reports from PRT Officers of ANAP patrolmen not being paid on a predictable and regularly scheduled basis; CSTC-A is working to address these claims. A second problem stems from the previously-noted MOI decision to recruit before training was available. The MoI now claims that each patrolman should receive backpay from the time of recruitment. After much discussion, the international community, through the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan, recommended to the PAG that each recruit from the 6 priority provinces receive payment of \$16 per month from the date of recruitment. This recommendation was recently accepted by both the PAG and MoI. The decision whether to provide backpay to the recruits from other regions is pending an assessment of three provinces in the East to determine whether the recruits were adequately vetted.

- (C/REL ISAF) Ethnic Balance. There are indications that the ethnic balance of the ANAP may not be completely representative of the districts. If ANAP units are not representative

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of the district ethnic balance, there is the potential the ANAP could serve as a coercive asset, directly or indirectly furthering the ambitions of Afghan warlords or other power brokers, or even of an individual or unit intending to undermine the GoA.

The Way Ahead

17. (C/REL ISAF) Post in coordination with the MoI, CSTC-A and international community is already developing and implementing solutions to the previously identified deficiencies that include:

- (C/REL ISAF) Vetting and adherence to the terms of reference. Due to identified deficiencies and the lack of MoI supervision of previous vetting efforts, all ANAP recruits will be revetted at the RTC,s to ensure that they meet the requirements outlined in the terms of reference. The Jalalabad RTC developed a process that is now being used by other facilities which includes completion of a personal interview and 2-page biographical information sheet, medical screening and background check. During the interview, tribal ethnicity will be recorded and the recruit will also be questioned about past militia affiliations. This process will be run by the MoI and Provincial Police Headquarters personnel with strict oversight by the international community and Dyn corps civpol mentors. This process will be accomplished at the RTC,s prior to the recruits being allowed to start training and will include representatives from the MoI, Provincial Police Headquarters recruiting and CID departments, and medical personnel. Another important safeguard is UNAMA,s agreement to conduct future spot checks of the vetting process and willingness to continue to monitor the tribal balance of the district ANAP forces. The US Embassy led assessment team will also continue to periodically visit the RTCs to ensure compliance with the agreed upon vetting procedures and verification of training standards.

-(S/REL ISAF) Facilities / training. In order to train the numbers of ANAP required prior to an expected increase in insurgency-related violence, we have agreed that all other police training programs will be suspended at the Jalalabad RTC for a period of at least 2 months. This will allow a concentrated focus on ANAP training and should result in the graduation of approximately 1800 ANAP from the Jalalabad RTC by June 2007. The Gardez RTC will be used in the same fashion. When the Gardez RTC concentrates solely on ANAP training, an additional 1500 patrolmen will graduate by the end of July. ANAP focused training started at the Jalalabad RTC on March 24th while the training at the Gardez RTC will commence in early May. The Jalalabad RTC is currently training 154 ANAP and will increase to its maximum capacity of 350 ANAP every two weeks in the near future. Gardez RTC will continue to train approximately 150 ANAP patrolmen per month until early May at which time it will start training approximately 500 ANAP recruits per month. While this initiative will result in the temporary suspension of other police training at the RTCs, training of justice and corrections programs will continue and

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will not be impacted.

- (C/REL ISAF) Pay. Post, in cooperation with the MoI, international community and CSTC-A, will continue to monitor this situation to ensure that all recruits receive the appropriate amount of backpay as expeditiously as possible. The Embassy-led team interviews individual ANP and ANAP Patrolmen to ascertain when they last received their salaries, the month that they enlisted and the first time they received any payment. The Dyncorp civpol mentors are also involved in evaluating the scope of the problem and mentoring the MoI to correct the situation as quickly as possible.

-(C/REL ISAF) Ethnic Balance. Due to the importance of maintaining a representative tribal balance, Post continues to remain engaged with the international community to verify the ethnic composition of the ANAP. Additional efforts that ensure the proper ethnic balance is recruited and deployed include the Embassy and UNAMA commitment to conducting spot checks and Task Force Phoenix,s effort to count the police forces nation-wide (Ref B).

Comment.

110. (C/REL ISAF) The ANAP is not only vital to bolstering the security forces within the nation but is an essential part of President Karzai,s plan to enhance national security. Although patrolmen are only hired for a one year period, if MoI fails to adhere to the agreed upon terms of reference or properly vet the patrolmen, the consequences will be serious. Additionally, if this force is not ethnically representative of the districts or is loyal to militia commanders rather than the GoA, there is the potential of creating a hollow force that will undermine national security and alienate the Afghan citizens from their national leaders. Moreover, lack of oversight and unreliable vetting will impact the GoA,s ability to counter the insurgency this year; the local people will

continue to feel unprotected by the government; and the enforcement of the rule of law and ability of the ANP to provide security to the citizens will remain minimal. The importance of this program necessitates constant, vigilant oversight. We are determined not to recruit a hollow, unreliable force. The Embassy will continue to work closely with MoI, CSTC-A, ISAF and UNAMA to identify discrepancies at early stages and develop solutions that will help ensure the success of this essential initiative.

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